Individualism and Communitarianism at Work by Kohler, Thomas C.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1993 | Issue 2 Article 13
5-1-1993
Individualism and Communitarianism at Work
Thomas C. Kohler
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 727 (1993).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1993/iss2/13
Individualism and Communitarianism 
a t  Work 
Thomas C. Kohler* 
Our Reporters have given us four remarkably rich, complex 
and thought-provoking contributions. Such wonderful work 
resists any attempt a t  quick summarization, and an effort at 
offering a brief commentary on the many and nuanced insights 
contained in these papers is likely to produce but a set of 
scattered and superficial observations. Fortunately, I largely 
have been spared such a bootless enterprise. For although I 
appear in the role of the "Commentator," I have been asked 
instead to  make a short report on the work-life sphere in the 
United States. I will proceed on my assignment in the following 
manner. In the first part of my remarks, I briefly will address 
a theme common to  all four Reports, and to the Colloquium as 
a whole-how we can be both one and many. I then will discuss 
the US. work-life situation directly, and conclude with a short 
evaluation of the position in which we find ourselves. 
I. ON BEING BOTH ONE AND MAIVY 
To begin with, the composition of this panel seems deeply 
symbolic in light of the theme of these meetings. Thus, the U.S. 
stands as the apogee of an individualistic order, Japan depicts 
the paradigm of a communitarian society, while the other 
nations represented appear to fall a t  various points along the 
spectrum. This observation takes us to the heart of the subject 
of our Colloquium. 
Broadly speaking, our topic deals with the question of how 
we can be both one and many-or, to phrase the point just 
slightly differently, how each of us can be a distinct and unique 
individual, yet remain related to all other distinct and unique 
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. (This paper reflects 
research on a larger study in which the author is engaged. He gratefully 
acknowledges the aid of the Fund for Labor Relations studies and the generous 
support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation in pursuit of this work.) 
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individuals. This presents a problem common to every sort of 
human community, from the state, t o  the relationship of 
employment, to the family itself. The character of our 
associations may differ, but our character as humans is a 
constant. Consequently, institutional orders inconsistent with 
our human character will not survive. 
How we can be both one and many is a comprehensive 
question, since engaging it forces us to inquire into the 
character and meaning of our personhood. As Professor 
Blanc-Jouvan points out, it is also an ancient question, one 
that is as old as political and legal philosophy themselves.' 
Indeed, the chief reason that the individualist-communitarian 
debate presently has such an interminable quality about it 
stems from the impoverished set of resources in which it is now 
conducted. 
Succinctly stated, we have only the language of 
individualism in which to pursue our questions and carry on 
our discussion. The paucity of meanings that this language 
carries with it leaves us with an enormous conceptual 
blind-spot: we can only comprehend individuals. We almost 
cannot conceive of groups o r  communities. This fact pushes us 
to posit a tremendously restricted set of possibilities. We are 
left to regard groups as representing affiliations among 
discrete, monadic and otherwise unassociated individuals, or to 
reify the group as the single, sole individual. Either way, we 
end up by denying something crucial about ourselves. We 
implicitly reject our character as social beings, or we submerge 
our particular and distinct individuality in the mass. 
Considered from the first perspective, human community of 
whatever description comes to be understood as artificial and 
instrumental alliances that are formed for the limited purpose 
of satisfying the self-directed wants of their otherwise 
unrelated members. These desires commonly are reduced to 
two categories: the desire for companionship (to enable 
self-fulfillment and self-expression) and the desire for economic 
or political power. This view imports with it a sort of 
reductionism. I t  suggests that human community of whatever 
sort derives its existence solely from the individuals who form 
it. Simply put, this perspective teaches us to view groups as 
limited  partnership^.^ They come into existence to secure some 
1. See Xavier Blanc-Jouvan, Zndiuidualisme et "communautarisme" en droit 
franpis: le cas &s relations de travail, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 693. 
2.  See WILSON C. MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF FRATERNITY IN h l E R I C A  89 
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end and fall apart once the goal is achieved, their raison d'etre 
having been exhausted. This viewpoint thereby reduces human 
solidarity to being a transient and instrumental thing that 
lasts only so long as some immediate and self-interested need 
remains unmet. In Chesterton's evocative imagery, it implies 
that humans in community merely are "physically stuck 
together like dates in a grocer's shop,"3 and as easily and 
harmlessly peeled apart. Professors Blanc-Jouvan and Teubner 
well describe the effect such patterns of thought have on our 
habits and on the health of our  institution^.^ 
The lone alternative our language supplies to 
understanding association as a coincidental aggregation of 
individuals is the characterization of the group as the single 
individual. Professor Inoue's paper chillingly describes the sorts 
of problems and pathological conditions that stem from this 
perspe~tive.~ This understanding of association represents a 
peculiar strain of individualism, one which, to adapt slightly an 
observation made by Wilson Carey McWilliams, is so rigid, 
friable and "sensitive that it cannot tolerate rule by  other^."^ 
As a result, this viewpoint insists on uniformity and 
conformity. Individuals exist only in and through the group; 
they have no separate being outside it. Association represents a 
sort of inward turning that rests on identity;' the self and the 
group simply mirror and affirm one another. 
In the final analysis, this understanding of association 
rests on a distortion of human existence that can be termed a 
group bias.' The products of this way of thinking have a 
depressing familiarity to those who live in the twilight years of 
this century. Its poisonous fruits include cults of the state (the 
aftermath of which Professor Wyrzykowski details),' cults of 
(1973). 
3. Quoted in MATTHEW L. LAMB, SOLIDARITY WITH VICTIMS ix (1982). 
4. See BlancJouvan, supra note 1, passim; Gunther Teubner, The "State" of 
Private Networks: The Emeqing Legal Regime of Polycorporatism in Germany, 1993 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 553 passim. 
5. See Tatsuo Inoue, The Poverty of Rights-Blind Commnality: Looking 
Through the Window of Japan, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 517, 520, 532-38. 
6. MCWILLIA~S, supra note 2, at 40. 
7. See id. (discussing identity in customary society and the erotic notion of the 
self that grounds the idea of the gemeinschaft). 
8. On the idea of the group bias, see BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A 
STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 247-50 (Frederic E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran 
eds., Univ. of Toronto 1992) (1958). 
9. See Miroslaw Wyrzykowski, Individualism and Communifurianism in a 
Contemporary Polish Legal System: Tensions and Accomnwdutions, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
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the people, and cults of other corporate bodies, however 
defined. These latter include morbidities as diverse as religious 
triumphalism and the "companyism" that seems part of many 
participative management schemes. 
That our language of individualism is not the only way to 
think and speak about the character of association and 
personhood is suggested by Professor Inoue's discussion of 
self-abnegation and symbolic death.'' Thus, for example, the 
kenosis or death to the self of the Pauline Gospels is not at all 
the same thing as the pathological self-annihilation that Inoue 
so tellingly describes.'' Likewise, the self-denial that classical 
political philosophy insists is requisite t o  an individual's ascent 
to knowing and authentic liberty stems f?om a different 
understanding of human character than the one assumed by 
our predominant individualistic discourse. 
Missing from the way we typically speak are points so well 
understood by, among others, Aristotle and Tocqueville. As 
they point out, humans are conditioned beings by virtue of the 
fact that we live and act only in communities. Indeed, most of 
our operating as individuals takes the form of cooperating with 
others.12 The communities in which we live and perform our 
tasks give us an orientation and an identity. They suggest to us 
not only who we are, but what our lives and our work mean. 
Consequently, communities have a normative function, and 
well-functioning communities represent an irreducible human 
good. In this perspective, communities and associations of every 
sort exist only for the individual. Yet, the social good is prior 
to-stands at  a more prominent level than-the individual 
good, because without it, the good for discrete, individual 
persons could not exist. 
The primary function of community is to  assist the full 
development and proper unfolding of human personality which 
in turn finds its complete expression in the activity of authentic 
self-rule. Thus, Aristotle, in the Politics, emphasizes the role of 
community as the place where the citizen learns "both to be 
ruled and to rule."13 Tocqueville likewise stresses the 
REV. 577, 577-80. 
10. See houe, supra note 5, at 532-38. 
11. Id. 
12. See BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD THEOLOGY 48 (Univ. of Toronto 
1990) (2d ed. 1972) (human intersubjectivity and structure of the human good). On 
the spontaneous character of human sociality, see also 1 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYE& 
LAW, LEGISIATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 35-54 (Univ. of Chicago 1973). 
13. A R I ~ T L E ,  P O ~ I C S  92 (Bk. 111, ch. 4 (12771315)) (Carnes Lord trans., 
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importance of associations and mediating groups and their 
potential t o  act as "schools for democracy."14 As both so clearly 
understood, individuals and societies alike become and remain 
self-governing only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in 
acts of self-government. The habit sustains the condition. 
In short, i t  is in community with others that we literally 
learn the political habits necessary to sustain life together. 
Hence, it is the small associations and mediating bodies in 
which community actually exists that act as "seedbeds" for the 
civic virtues. These bodies set the conditions for the sort of civic 
friendships that hold a society together and that facilitate the 
civil conversations that ground self-rule. As Edmund Burke 
observes, 'To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little 
platoon we belong to in society is the first principle (the germ 
as it were) of public affections. I t  is the first link in the series 
by which we proceed toward a love of our country and to 
mankind."15 Bluntly put, we cannot learn toleration and 
respect for others in a vacuum. Nor can we learn or practice 
self-rule in isolation. Humans are not self-sufficient beings. We 
only learn who we are, and gain some sense of the fullness of 
our human potencies, through acting with others. This fqct 
leads Aristotle to observe that the person without community 
"is either a beast or a god."16 The mention of a vacuum and 
the want of community turns us to consider the current state of 
the work-life sphere in the United States. 
II. WORK-LIFE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Since at least the time of Tocqueville, foreign scholars have 
shown a great interest in various attributes of the American 
legal system. One of the things for which the United States has 
become best known is its home-grown institution of "free" 
collective bargaining. In this regime, the state establishes and 
sanctions a voluntary ordering system, but leaves the outcomes 
achieved through the process to be determined by the parties 
themselves, free of governmental influence. The legal 
framework for American-style collective bargaining stands as 
1984). 
14. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 63 (J.P. Meyer ed. & 
George Lawrence trans., 1969). 
15. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110 (Thomas 
Mahoney ed., 1955). 
16. ARISM)TLE, supm note 13, at 37 (Bk. I, ch. 2 (1253a25)). 
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an example of what Gunther Tuebner terms a "reflexive" legal 
scheme.17 The goal of reflexive law, Tuebner suggests, is 
"regulated autonomy," or controlled self-regulation.18 Reflexive 
legal schemes entail minimal state intervention in the ordering 
of relationships since they rely on market mechanisms to shape 
their results. The fact that the traits of this system may now 
be better known outside the United States than within its 
borders gives some hint of the state of our domestic situation. 
In the United States, the term collective bargaining 
virtually is synonymous with the Wagner Act.lg The core goal 
of the statute is t o  protect and enhance individuals' status 
through the defense and maintenance of freely formed and 
autonomous employee groups. This feature defines the statute 
and characterizes the unique position the Act holds in 
American law. I t  represents the only place in our otherwise 
highly individualistically-oriented jurisprudence where the law 
has encouraged the formation of mediating bodies through 
which to promote individual empowerment and t o  foster 
self-determination. In the final analysis, the Wagner Act rests 
on a distinctly different idea of the character of our personhood 
than that which typically informs American law.20 The 
transformations that have occurred in our culture and mores 
since the time of the Act's passage, however, appear to have 
left the statute's basic purpose and meanings increasingly 
opaque to  us. 
Congress enacted the Wagner Act in 1935. In so doing, and 
in sharp contrast to the course taken by the rest of the 
industrialized world, Congress deliberately opted for a system 
that would involve minimal state intervention in the 
employment relationship. In the United States context, 
collective bargaining can be best and most thoroughly 
understood as a private law-making system. Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court has described the collective bargaining 
agreement as not just a contract, but "a generalized coden21 
17. Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 
LAW & SOC'Y REV. 239, 254-55 (1983). 
18. Id. 
19. 29 U.S.C. $8 151-69 (1988). 
20. See generally Thomas C .  Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: 
Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of 
DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149. 
21. Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 580 
(1964). 
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that represents "an effort to erect a system of industrial 
self-government" through which the employment relationship 
can be "governed by an agreed-upon rule of law."22 
The promulgation and administration of this law largely is 
the responsibility of the affected parties alone. Consequently, 
American collective bargaining agreements typically erect a 
private dispute resolution system-the grievance arbitration 
process-that the employer and union jointly administer. These 
systems generally have jurisdiction over nearly every sort of 
dispute that might arise concerning the employment 
relationship. The presence of an arbitration system normally 
precludes the courts or other arms of the state from 
adjudicating matters that come within the parties' dispute 
resolution scheme. 
The so-called exclusivity principle bottoms the American 
model of collective bargaining. It also marks one of the starkest 
differences between the  American and Continental 
industrial-relations systems. The exclusivity principle rests on 
the idea of majority rule. The principle establishes the 
association formed by a majority of employees in the affected 
workplace unit as the exclusive representative of them all. The 
principle prohibits an employer from attempting to bypass the 
majority-designated representative by unilaterally changing the 
terms or conditions of employment, or by dealing with 
individuals or groups of employees independently of the union. 
The preferred status the majority-representative enjoys in this 
scheme carries with it the legally enforceable obligation to 
represent all employees fairly and even-handedly, regardless of 
their support for or membership in the union. 
The exclusivity doctrine prevents the fragmentation and 
dissolution of the strength employees achieve through collective 
action. I t  thereby acts to protect the principles of 
majoritarianism that underpin the Act's scheme. The 
exclusivity principle reflects the fact that American workers 
generally organize and bargain on a workplace or employer 
basis, and not a t  an industry-wide or national level. To a 
substantial degree, the principle is a function of the emphasis 
in American-style collective bargaining on local, 'bottoms-up" 
law-making. The centrality of exclusivity to the Act's scheme 
reveals the statute's preoccupation with the removal of 
22. Id. at 580. 
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impediments to the free formation of autonomous, 
self-organized employee associations. 
In considering the statute, it is important to note that 
Congress did not "invent" collective bargaining. Rather, 
Congress through the Wagner Act adopted a scheme whose 
characteristics and practices jointly had been developed over 
time by workers and employers. Congress in passing the Act 
intended to institute a comprehensive uniform and fleirible 
system through which the employment relationship could be 
ordered. Hence, rather than attempting to  adjust specific 
problems legislatively, the Act left it to  the parties themselves 
to identify and resolve matters of mutual concern. The chief 
significance of the American collective bargaining scheme lies 
in the opportunity it provides to involve people in making and 
administering the law that most directly determines the details 
of their daily lives. The process both permits and requires 
people to decide for themselves the kind of people they will be, 
and to explain and justify those choices to one another. 
The Wagner Act was amended in 1947 and again in 1959. 
The latter date is signif"1cant because it marks the last time the 
United States as a nation gave anything like comprehensive 
consideration to the question of how to order the employment 
relationship. To be certain, many changes have occurred in the 
past three decades. The legal responses, however, have been on 
a piecemeal basis, and typically without full regard for all their 
implications. 
The decline in private-sector unionization constitutes one 
of the most pronounced changes that has occurred in the 
United States work-life sphere during the past thirty years. In 
his report, Professor BlancJouvan describes France as having 
reached a "critical threshold," with union membership in the 
private-sector at  5-6%.23 The U.S. is not far behind. Right 
around 1960, approximately 34% of the U.S. private-sector 
workforce was organized.* Today, that figure is under 1 2 % ~ ~  
23. See BlancJouvan, supra note 1, at 720. 
24. Leo Troy, Convergence in Zntemtional Unionism, etc. The Case of Canada 
and the U S A . ,  30 B R ~ .  J . INDUS. REL. 1, 39, Table A-2 (1992) (compiling data); 
Robert J. L&nde & Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times for Unions: Another Look at 
the Signif~ance of Employer Illegalities, 58 U .  CHI. L. REV. 953, 953 n.1 (1991) 
(explaining difficulties in compiling data on union membership rates). 
25. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, 
at 422, No. 672 (112th ed. 1992) (union members, by selected characteristics, 1983 
and 1991). 
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and some expect it to fall to 7% by the end of this decade.26 
Significantly,. the decline of unions began a t  roughly the 
same t ime t h a t  families, neighborhoods, religious 
congregations, service and fraternal groups, local political 
clubs, and the other institutions that characterized American 
democracy began to unravel. This is no mere coincidence. No 
single "mediating body," whether in the form of families, 
churches, civic, political and service organizations, or unions, is 
likely to survive in the absence of the others. All of them 
require and can instill the same sorts of habits: decision, 
commitment, self-rule and direct responsibility. No single 
institution on its own can inculcate or sustain these 
characteristics. The existence and decline of all these bodies is 
mutually conditioning; the collapse or deformation of any of 
them affects the rest. 
So, what's become of what Tocqueville called "the nation of 
joiners"? Recent survey data indicates that Americans remain 
eager participants in the activities of voluntary associations. 
Yet, the same data suggests that during the past thirty years, 
much of that participation has been limited to clipping a 
coupon in a magazine and returning it with a small financial 
contribution to an association like the Sierra Club, Common 
Cause, or the American Association of Retired Persons (which 
is now the largest voluntary association in the U.S.). The 
smaller, local bodies that directly mediate the relationship 
between individuals and the large institutions of public 
life-and which involve people in the often messy business of 
actually associating with each other-are faring less well. 
The American work-life sphere has not been insulated from 
the trends toward fragmentation that have affected the other 
institutions of civil life. Commentators as diverse as Emile 
Durkheim, John Dewey, Elton Mayo and Frank Tannenbaum 
all predicted that the workplace would become a primary 
source of common life in modern society. Consequently, they 
26. Causes of Loss of Union Membership Debated at New York University 
Conference on Labor, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), June 8, 1992, at A-3 (Leo Troy) 
(projecting from present trends). Significantly, in their 1985 article, Accounting for 
the Decline in Union Membership, 1950-80, 38 1M)US. & LAB. REL. REV. 325 (1985), 
William T. Dickens and Jonathan S. Leonard stated that if the number of private 
sedor nonconstruction union members remained roughly constant, and if 
"employment continues to expand at about 2.5% per year, the unionized share of 
the workforce will not fall below 15% before 1995." By 1989, private sector 
diversity had reached 12% and has continued to decline. 
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urged that special attention be paid to the employment 
relationship and to occupational groups that could assist in 
grounding individuals in the conditions created by modern 
markets and mass democracies. That attention has not been 
forthcoming. Instead, along with the decline of unions and 
other mediating bodies has come a significant loosening in the 
employment bond itself. So-called contingent employment 
arrangements (part-time, temporary and contract-based) are on 
the rise, and are expected to double over the next few years. 
One well-known observer of labor market trends characterized 
these arrangements as "just-in-time" employment.27 As 
American industry seeks to become more competitive, she 
predicted, "all employment relationships are going to become 
more I t  may be that instability increasingly 
characterizes many of the significant relationships among 
Americans: employment relationships in the U.S. now last an 
average of 4.5 years,2' while the average marriage lasts but 
seven.30 Trends are not wholly clear, but the average length of 
both may be on the way down. 
Consistent with these developments is the fact that 
increasingly the workplace itself is less one "place." Thus, for 
example, ten percent of the Chicago area employees of 
American Telephone and Telegraph now work at locations 
other than company facilities-many of them at home. Despite 
concerns about the impact of employee isolation, such 
"telecommuter" arrangements are on the rise. 
Our legal culture also has influenced our prevailing views 
about the desirability of a system that promotes private 
ordering through groups. In short, it has taught us to apply 
what Paul Ricoeur calls the "hermeneutic of suspicion"31 
towards groups, and to see in them an ever-present threat to 
personal liberties and the unfettered exercise of individual 
27. Rising Use of Part-Time and Temporary Workers: Who Benefits and Who 
Loses?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Housing of the House 
Comm. on Government Operations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1988) (statement of 
Audrey Freeman, Executive Director, Human Resources hogram Group, The 
Conference Board). 
28. Id. at 36. 
29. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, News, June 26, 1992 
(USDL 92-386) (includes tables compiling data). 
30. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992, 
at 92, No. 132 (112th ed. 1992) (median duration of marriage, 1970-88). 
31. PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 34, 63-64 (John 
B. Thompson ed. & trans., 1981). 
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choice. Thus, it is not without significance that since the 
mid-1960s, the First Amendment freedom to  associate has 
received its greatest development a t  the hands of the United 
States Supreme Court as the freedom not to associate. In 
similar fashion, the judicially-created union duty of fair 
representation has been developed during the past twenty-five 
years in a way that has deeply intruded the courts into the 
internal affairs of unions.32 The courts thus have breached the 
public-private distinction which they so scrupulously observed 
in the early cases that first announced this duty nearly fifty 
years ago.3S To the extent they have done so, the courts have 
made unions public institutions. Indeed, it was fear that 
government intervention would eventually result in the 
regulation of unions that led the noted scholar and social 
commentator, Mary van Kleek, to oppose passage of the 
Wagner 
So, what has replaced collective bargaining? Like nature, 
law abhors a vacuum. Thus, the piecemeal and ad hoc 
regulation of the employment relationship markedly has 
increased as the practice of collective bargaining has declined. 
Common law courts have entered the area by developing 
various contract, tort and public policy-based restrictions of an 
employer's ability to discharge or discipline employees. 
Congress and state legislatures also have become very active in 
enacting a wide variety of legislation addressed to specific 
workplace problems. This thrust away from private ordering 
has left parties with a contracting boundary within which to 
regulate the terms of their relationship through collective 
bargaining. Moreover, some of this legislation, like the 
landmark Americans with Disabilities conflicts at  
several places with the law under the National Labor Relations 
In short, Congress itself seems to have forgotten about 
collective bargaining and to  have abandoned it as a means for 
adjusting work-life issues. 
Collective bargaining provides a powerful means for 
32. For one spectacular example, see Smith v. Hussman Refrigerator Co., 619 
F.2d 1229 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). 
33. See Steele v. louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 
34. See IRVING B E ~ I N ,  'IQE NEW DEAL COUECTTVE BARGAINING POLICY 67 
(1950). 
35. 42 U.S.C. 55 12101-213 (Supp. 1992). 
36. 29 U.S.C. $4 151-69 (1988). The National Labor Relations Act is the 
Wagner Act as amended. 
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employees t o  participate in workplace decisions. As 
unionization has declined, management has responded with 
participation schemes of its own. In contrast to the collective 
bargaining model, however, which is founded on the formation 
of autonomous employee groups and assumes that workers and 
management have mutual as well as divergent interests, the 
managerially sponsored schemes have little room for unions 
and are based on convincing employees t o  see corporate goals 
as being identical with their own. There is nothing new about 
such schemes. Their use long-predated passage of the Wagner 
Act, and they represent a competing scheme of participation to 
that sanctioned by the statute?' While the legality of such 
unilaterally implemented schemes under the Act is highly 
questionable, their use appears widespread. 
Considering the United States situation in light of 
Continental developments raises the question of whether 
something like a transference-instead of convergence-of 
orders is at least potentially underway. The employment 
relationship in the U.S. is ever-increasingly being subjected to 
direct and pervasive state regulation. In the meantime, the 
stated desire of the Social Charter seems to be to nudge the 
European Community states in the opposite dire~tion.~' Thus, 
consistent with the subsidiarity principle that suffuses its 
terms, the Social Charter expressly endorses collective 
bargaining as a means to implement the Charter's g0als.3~ I t  
also provides that collective bargaining agreements can act as a 
source of Community law. Likewise, France's continuing efforts 
under its "Auroux" laws to institute greater private ordering 
through a "social dialogue" stands in sharp contrast to the 
trends seen in the United States. 
Prospects for any sort of comprehensive legal reform aimed 
a t  revivifymg and restoring the practice of private ordering 
through collective bargaining appear very poor indeed. Unions 
have slight political influence-as the 1992 presidential 
campaign demonstrated. "Jobs" was the mantra of both the 
37. For a description of participation schemes and their premises, see Thomas 
C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Signifiance of Section 
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 500-34 (1986). 
38. The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, 
COM(89)471 fmal. 
39. On this point, see Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons From the Social Charter 
State, CoqJoration and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORONTO LJ. 
(forthcoming Summer 1993). 
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parties. Yet, not one authentic representative of working men 
and women was invited to speak at  either the Democratic or 
the Republican conventions. To both parties, unions have 
become "special interest groups," and the once-celebrated 
practice of industrial self-government has come to be regarded 
as a danger to "competitiveness." 
An undertaking as controversial and as sweeping in impact 
as comprehensive labor law reform requires real political 
discipline to achieve. Such discipline is a function of methodical 
organization and a structure that can hold potential wanderers 
to positions settled on by the parties. Such structure and 
ability to impose discipline presently are lacking among 
Republicans and Democrats alike. Hence, although they parade 
under the banner of one or the other of the parties, those in the 
legislative branch more and more act as  independent 
contractors. Indeed, the parties themselves currently exist 
chiefly as fund-raising organizations which ask little more of 
their "members" than regular financial contributions. The 
parties' once vibrant connections to the grass-roots, which 
existed in the form of precinct, ward and county organizations 
and neighborhood political clubs, now largely have disappeared. 
Their demise has been helped along, incidentally, by various 
United States Supreme Court opinions that, in the name of the 
First Amendment freedom of association, dissolved the 
institutions supporting local political activity.40 
In short, we will have and presently are undertaking labor 
law reform. But, it is coming about through a series of 
unconnected half-steps that amount t o  a de facto repeal of the 
National Labor Relations Act rather than through any fully 
considered and comprehensive course of action. The ultimate 
results likely will be a much different workplace and social 
order than any we envisioned-m intended. 
111. EVALUATION: DEPENDENCY AND THE 
QUESTION OF PERSONHOOD 
It  is appropriate here to make a quick evaluation of our 
common situation. We began with the image of a spectrum and 
the suggestion that the nations represented on this panel 
covered the range of the individualist-communitarian legal and 
40. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Elrod v. Burns, 
427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
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social models. But, it may turn out that no spectrum exists. 
Instead, as we consider each Report, we find the same result, 
with our Reporters describing what are actually variations on a 
theme. 
To summarize briefly: In the United States, we have what 
might be called a condition of "formal individualism." There are 
relatively few self-organized mediating structures in the work- 
life sphere, and those that exist represent a dwindling 
membership. Ever less constrained by collectively set 
determinations, Americans are free t o  bargain and select the 
terms and conditions of their employment individually. In 
reality, this means that individuals have become increasingly 
dependent on their employers and the state to regulate the 
order of the employment relationship. Few actually participate 
directly in making and administering the law that governs 
their lives in the workplace. 
This state of dependency appears ubiquitous. Thus, in 
France we find plenty of mediating structures-but no 
members. In Germany, we discover the emergence of what 
Professor Tuebner calls "polycorporatist" structures that 
mediate horizontally among specialized sectors of society which 
are rooted in different horizons of meanings!' In Germany, as 
in France and the United States, the continuing fragmentation 
of common understandings, and the relentless spread of 
instrumental reason, has left these structures with highly 
attenuated links to their "base." Lastly, we find in Japan a 
situation in which individuals are highly dependent on 
corporate structures. In short, across the board, we see the 
same thing: dependent individuals possessed of little ability to 
determine the day-to-day conditions of their lives. Wherever we 
look, we find individuals not as self-determining agents, but as 
objects of administration. 
All of this returns us to the fundamental theme of our 
Colloquium and invites us to consider the extent to which our 
present approaches successfully have resolved the question of 
how we can be both many and one. The results of our 
comparative inquiry also press us to ask whether modern 
liberalism, with its limited conception of community, ends up 
by undermining the social conditions necessary to sustain its 
noble project of enhancing individual status and personal 
41. See Teubner, supra note 4. 
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liberty. Raising this question prompts us to consider again 
what a human is. It may well be that the notions of personhood 
that typically inform our thoughts are deeply inadequate, and 
that we are far more than we think ourselves to be. To put the 
point briefly: Was Tocqueville correct in insisting that in the 
modern era, self interest "provides the only stable point in the 
human heart,'"'2 and hence, the sole basis for grounding a 
democracy? 
This point raises the most fundamental of questions and 
requires us to ask whether we are sovereign beings invested 
with rights or conditional beings, situated by mutual 
obligations. These matters turn us to inquire about what 
humans properly can claim to know, and whether there are 
limits to intelligibility. As the French Reporter points out, we 
cannot long stay on this terrain without confronting the 
philosophers and the moralists.43 But, neither can we avoid 
these questions if we are to take our own work and its 
implications seriously. There is a natural desire to pursue such 
issues, which can be suppressed only by deforming ourselves 
and distorting the order that we bequeath to subsequent 
generations. 
42. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 14, at 239. 
43. BlancJouvan, supra note 1, at 694. 
